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Non-technical summary
Administrative individual data does not contain complete information concerning individ-
ual employment trajectories. For this reason, there are gaps or unobserved periods and the
individual labor market state is sometimes unknown. In this paper, we present an approach
how to empirically analyze transition times to competing labor market states in the case of such
missing information. As a solution to the resulting data-driven identification problem, we derive
bounds for the observed destination-specific transition times. By performing a nonparametric
analysis, we provide a flexible and descriptive tool for the analysis of observed risk-specific
transition time distributions in presence of partially identified interval data. As an advantage
over earlier attempts, our approach does not assume that the competing labor market states
are independent.
We apply our framework to empirically evaluate the effect of unemployment benefits on
observed migration probabilities in Germany. For this purpose, we exploit a natural exper-
iment that generates some exogenous variation of entitlement length, namely the reform of
unemployment benefit entitlements in Germany in 1997. This reform reduced the length of
entitlements for certain age groups by up to ten months. As a consequence, it is possible to
construct a treatment group with shortened entitlement length and a control group for whom
entitlements have been unaffected by the reform. Given the partial identification problem in
our data, we then apply our bounds framework to analyze the effect of the reform on migration
and other destination states. The findings indicate that missing interval information in German
individual administrative data at first precludes any clear result as the resulting bounds tend
to be very wide. When introducing additional assumptions, bounds are generally much tighter.
For high-skilled individuals, for whom the threat of entitlement loss due to the 1997 reform
is likely to be largest, our results are indicative for a mobility-reducing effect of an extensive
receipt of unemployment benefits.
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Abstract
In this paper we derive nonparametric bounds for the cumulative incidence curve
within a competing risks model with partly identified interval data. As an advantage
over earlier attempts our approach also gives valid results in case of dependent compet-
ing risks. We apply our framework to empirically evaluate the effect of unemployment
benefits on observed migration of unemployed workers in Germany. Our findings weakly
indicate that reducing the entitlement length for unemployment benefits increases migra-
tion among high-skilled individuals.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we present an approach how to empirically analyze models of competing risks
in the case of partially identified interval data. As an example, administrative unemployment
duration data from Germany provide only incomplete information concerning the duration until
leaving unemployment to different states because there are unobserved periods in an individ-
ual’s employment trajectory (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004). As a result of such incomplete
information, parameters of interest can only be bounded (Manski, 2003). Lee and Wilke (2005)
bound a difference-in-differences treatment effect on the marginal survival probability over dif-
ferent definitions of the latent durations. They assume independent censoring within a single
risk framework. If this assumption holds, estimated bounds for the marginal survivor function
are unbiased while they are biased in case of dependent censoring or dependent competing risks.
The contribution of this paper is to present a solution to the data-driven identification
problem that gives also valid results in the case of dependent competing risks. For this purpose,
we extend the bounds framework for partially identified data to a competing risks setting
and derive bounds for the cumulative incidence curve (CIC) instead of assuming independent
censoring. By using the CIC (see also Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980), our analysis bounds the
risk-specific distribution of observed durations rather than latent durations. Our approach is
fully nonparametric and thus we do not impose assumptions that may be violated in the real
world.
Our work is relevant as partial identification is a common problem in merged administrative
individual data from many countries. The literature using such data is growing in recent years
and governments use this data to analyze policy reforms. In this light we illustrate our approach
by analyzing the effect of unemployment compensation on the probability of migration. The
findings of former work on this topic are not conclusive. A number of studies generally confirm
a disincentive effect of unemployment compensation on the transitions from unemployment to
employment (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine, 2000; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2004;
van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). These findings are in line with the predictions from search
theory that considers unemployment compensation to raise reservation wages (Atkinson and
Micklewright, 1991). The effect on migration, however, is less clear. The negative effect of
rising reservation wages and smaller geographical search horizons as a reaction to higher benefit
levels (Hassler at al., 2005) contrasts a positive resource effect as higher unemployment benefits
levels enable individuals to bear migration cost (Tatsiramos, 2003) and to increase expenditures
that enhance the productiveness of job search (Barron and Mellow, 1979; Tannery, 1983).
Most studies, however, seem to suggest a mobility-reducing effect of unemployment benefits
on migration (Goss and Paul, 1990, Antolin and Bover, 1997). Consistent with these findings,
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Arntz (2005) and Arntz and Wilke (2007) provide some evidence that unemployed in Germany
who are entitled to receive unemployment benefits (UNB) for an extended period of more than
18 months are much less likely to leave unemployment and migrate than individuals with a
shorter period of UNB receipt. To some extent the findings of these studies may be driven by
an unobserved selection of immobile individuals into unemployment benefits or an extensive
receipt of UNB. In a study with individual fixed effects that should mitigate such biases,
Tatsiramos (2003) finds a positive effect of unemployment benefits on migration, a result that
he assigns to the mobility-enhancing resource effect of unemployment benefits. As a drawback,
however, this study does not take account of competing transitions to local employment. Our
bounds analysis thus reexamines the effect of shorter unemployment benefit receipt on possibly
dependent transitions to either local or non-local employment via migration. For this purpose,
we exploit a natural experiment that generates some exogenous variation of entitlement length,
namely the reform of unemployment benefit entitlements in Germany in 1997. This reform
reduced the length of entitlements for certain age groups by up to 10 months. Our findings
indicate that missing interval information in German individual administrative data at first
precludes any clear result as the bounds tend to be very wide. By introducing additional
assumptions, bounds can be tightened. For high-skilled individuals, for whom the threat of
entitlement loss due to the 1997 reform is likely to be largest, our results are indicative for the
mobility-reducing effect of an extensive receipt of unemployment benefits.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section presents the theoretical framework
for the bounds analysis. Section three applies the proposed method to analyze the effect of
unemployment benefits on the cumulative incidence of migration. Section four concludes.
2 Model
In this model we study state transition times with k = 0, 1, . . . , K different competing labor
market states. We let Tlk be a random variable of the latent transition time from an original
state l = 0, 1, . . . , K, to a destination state k = 0, 1, . . . , K. l denotes the original state and
k denotes the destination state and k 6= l. We denote k = 0 as the state of unemployment
whereas k = 1, . . . , K represents states such as employment in the local or a non-local area or
being out of labor force. There are i = 1, . . . , n independent identically distributed realizations
τilk of Tlk. For simplicity, we suppress subscript i in the rest of this paper. In case k = 0,
the end date of the last employment spell is normalized as Tl0 = 0, for l = 1, . . . , K. We are
particularly interested in studying unemployment duration, i.e. the transition time T0k from
state l = 0 to state k = 1, . . . , K, and its realization τ0k with k = 1, . . . , K. When there is no
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ambiguity, we suppress the subscript of the original state 0. The latent transition time is then
T0k = Tk and its realization is τ0k = τk. We assume that τlk 6= τlm for all l and all k 6= m.
X is a vector of exogenous individual characteristics and Tlk are some unknown functions of
X. Tmax is an exogenous random variable that refers to the maximum observation period and
tmax is its realization. In other words, we have independent right censoring at the end of the
observation period. In what follows r is the exit state which has the shortest latent transition
time among all τk with k = 1, . . . , K, i.e.
r =

1 if τ1 = mink{τk};
...
K if τK = mink{τk}.
Other labor market states such as becoming self-employed or being out of the labor force
are not observable and thus produce observational gaps in the interval data. For simplicity,
we pool all unobserved labor market states to one state K.1 Since an observational gap after
the end of unemployment compensation transfers may also refer to continued unemployment
without receiving unemployment compensation, it is not clear whether an individual remains
unemployed or leaves to one of the unobserved exit states K after the end of transfer receipt.
The data structure thus implies that the unemployment duration and the transition to one of
the other exit states k = 1, ..., K − 1 can unambiguously be identified only if the individual
receives unemployment compensation during the entire time period of unemployment.
Figure 1 illustrates the fully identified case where the observed transition time refers to the
transition time from state 0 (unemployment) to state k 6= K such that τr =mink 6=K{τk}. Thus,
the transition time is point-identified with known exit state r 6= K.
Figure 1: A fully identified unemployment duration with τr =mink 6=K{τk}.
-
0 tmaxmink 6=K{τk}
-
UC
By contrast, if interval data is only partly identified, the true unemployment duration may
not be point identified. As a consequence, parameters of interest can only be bounded (Lee and
Wilke, 2005). Our modeling framework steps behind recent work by not assuming independence
1The model can be easily extended to more one unobserved labor market states but it is not interesting to
distinguish between different unobservable risks.
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between competing risks. Let us denote the beginning of the first unobserved period by the
random variable C and its realization by ς. In our application, this is typically the end date
of receiving unemployment compensation. In many cases, unemployment compensation stops
because unemployment benefits have been exhausted and the individual does not pass a means-
test for unemployment assistance. Other reasons are benefit sanctions for unemployed who did
not comply with the eligibility criteria. Both cases can be hardly predicted and are typically
not random. Since the earliest exit to K occurs at the beginning of an unobserved time period,
it holds that ς ≤ τK and thus C and TK are not independent, i.e. C = TK − ξ(TK) where
ξ(TK) ∈ [0, TK ] is some positive random function. Given the data structure, there are also
observations where the receipt of unemployment compensation does not immediately start after
the end of an employment period and thus there is an unobserved period starting at Tl0 = 0
so that ς = 0. Moreover, ς is observed only if ς ≤ τr. In the case of our fully identified data in
Figure 1, we therefore have τr =mink 6=K{τk} < ς ≤ τK and ς is not observed.
Figure 2: A partially identified unemployment duration for which ς is observed and ς ≤ sk 6=K ≤
tmax.
-
0 ς tmaxsk 6=K
-
UC
-
N/A
Figure 2 illustrates the case where we observe ς, i.e. ς ≤ τr due to an unobserved period after
a period of unemployment compensation transfers.2 In this case, τr cannot be point identified
from the data and has to be bounded. For this purpose we denote the first observed transition
time after an unobserved period as sk 6=K . It is possible to construct worst-case bounds for τr:
1. The upper bound of τr can be obtained by assuming that there is no exit to K during
the unobserved period. Instead, unemployment continues until sk 6=K and so τr is equal to
sk 6=K = mink 6=K{τk}. In other words, by ignoring ς, τr would be identified as in Figure 1.
2. The lower bound of τr can be obtained by assuming that there is an exit to K during the
unobserved period, i.e. r = K. Then the earliest transition to K can occur at ς so that
the lowest value of τr is ς. In this case, sk 6=K equals to τK + τKk and can be ignored.
2As discussed before, an unobserved period can also occur directly after an employment period. In this case
ς = 0. Moreover, there can be more than one unobserved period between records of unemployment compensation
transfers.
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If we observe ς, the true value τr lies always in the interval [ς, sk 6=K). We now define a variable
δ to formalize the identification of τr from the data as follows:
δ =
{
0 if ς is not observed;
1 if ς is observed
Events δ = 0, 1 are disjoint and can be distinguished in the data. If ς is not observed in the
data, we have δ = 0, and τr is fully identified. If we have δ = 1, the unemployment duration is
partially identified and τr is unknown. If we knew that r 6= K, then τr would be known. But
if r = K, we only know that τK ∈ [ς, sk 6=K). The difficulty in an application is that for δ = 1
we do not know whether r = K or r 6= K.
In addition to the identification problem that arises from the uncertainty of τr in the case
of δ = 1, our competing risk setting also implies another identification problem which is re-
lated to the general identification problem of competing risks. If risks are not independent, the
marginal distribution for each competing risk cannot be identified without additional paramet-
ric assumptions (Cox, 1962; Tsiatis, 1975). In light of this additional identification problem,
partial effects and changes in the latent distributions can also only be bounded. Non-parametric
bounds on the marginal distribution as have been proposed by Peterson (1976) are typically
too wide to infer some causal interpretation. As an alternative, parametric assumptions can be
imposed to tighten bounds or to achieve full identification. Under rather restrictive assump-
tions, Heckman and Honore´ (1989) and Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show identification
of the semiparametric mixed proportional hazard model. Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006)
impose quite mild assumptions to obtain tight bounds for parameters within the accelerated
failure time model. Our approach avoids such parametric assumptions which are unlikely to
be met in our application and hence leaves the fundamental identification problem unresolved.
As its main contribution, however, it tackles the identification problem that stems from partial
identification of interval data. Moreover, by using bounds on the cumulative incidence curve,
it provides a non-parametric tool which has a meaningful interpretation also in presence of
dependent competing risks.
The CIC refers to the observed probability of experiencing a transition to a specific state
prior to a certain time in the presence of all competing risks. It therefore does not recover the
underlying risk-specific marginal distribution of latent durations. Instead, it refers to observed
transition probabilities. Related literature also refers to this as a subdistribution. In the
following, we derive bounds on the identification region of the CIC which reflect the partial
identification of τr only. These bounds do not resolve the identification problem of competing
risks models. Equivalent bounds can also be derived for the overall survivor curve while bounds
for other functions such as cause-specific hazard rate or the cause-specific cumulative hazard
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rate cannot be derived. In the following, we restrict our attention to the observable risks
k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
The CIC for transition to state k at time t (see Moeschberger and Klein, 1995) can be decom-
posed:
Ik(t|x) = P (Tk ≤ t, r = k|x)
= P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 0|x) + P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 1|x)
= P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 0|x)
+P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, r 6= K, δ = 1|x) + P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, r = K, δ = 1|x)
= P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 0|x) + P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, r 6= K, δ = 1|x) (1)
for k = 1, . . . , K − 1. The second part of (1) is not identified since we cannot identify r in
presence of δ = 1. Therefore, as discussed before, the second part of (1) can only be bounded.
The lower bound relies on the assumption that unobserved periods correspond for sure to an
unobserved labor market state r = K, i.e. P (r 6= K|δ = 1, x) = 0. In this case, the second part
of (1) is zero. By contrast, it is non-zero under the upper bound assumption that there is for
sure continued unemployment during an unobserved period, i.e. P (r 6= K|δ = 1, x) = 1. In this
case, τr is identified and P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, r 6= K, δ = 1|x) can be directly estimated from the
data. Note that these worst case bounds assume the conditional probability P (r 6= K|δ = 1, x)
to be either zero or one for all t. As suggested by Manski (2003), we bound the unknown
probability P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, r 6= K, δ = 1|x) by an interval which is identifiable with the
available data structure. To see this, we rewrite (1) as:
Ik(t|x) = P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 0|x)
+P (Tk ≤ t, r = k|r 6= K, δ = 1, x)P (r 6= K|δ = 1, x)P (δ = 1|x). (2)
The worst-case lower bound on the identification region of the CIC of risk k 6= K is then given
by assuming P (r 6= K|δ = 1, x) = 0:
ILBk (t|x) = P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 0|x). (3)
The worst-case upper bound for the CIC is obtained by assuming P (r 6= K|δ = 1, x) = 1:
IUBk (t|x) = P (Tk ≤ t, r = k, δ = 0|x)
+P (Tk ≤ t, r = k|r 6= K, δ = 1, x)P (δ = 1|x) (4)
It directly follows that ILBk (t|x) ≤ IUBk (t|x) for all t.
The bounds given in (3) and (4) can be estimated nonparametrically by using Kaplan-Meier
type estimators, as the censoring time Tmax is independent (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002).
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Let t0 < . . . < tj < . . . < tJ be the discrete times at which τk 6=K , ς and tmax are observed.
For the estimation of the lower bound (3) there are dLBkj observed exits to risk type k 6= K at
time tj; d
LB
cj observed realizations of C at tj; and d
LB
mj censored observations at tmax = tj. For
k 6= K, we have:
dLBkj =
n∑
i=1
1I(τik = min{τik, ςi, ti,max})
dLBcj =
n∑
i=1
1I(ςi = min{τik, ςi, ti,max})
dLBmj =
n∑
i=1
1I(ti,max = min{τik, ςi, ti,max})
with 1I(Y ) is the indicator function of the event Y .
In contrast, ς can be ignored for the estimation of the upper bound (4). Moreover, in this
case we have τr = sr 6=K . Then we define dUBkj and d
UB
mj analogously as
dUBkj =
n∑
i=1
1I(τik = min{τik, ti,max})
dUBmj =
n∑
i=1
1I(ti,max = min{τik, ti,max}).
Let dLBj =
∑K−1
k=1 d
LB
kj + d
LB
cj + d
LB
mj and d
UB
j =
∑K−1
r=1 d
UB
kj + d
UB
mj . The number of observations
at risk just before tj is then given by
nLBj = d
LB
j + . . .+ d
LB
J and n
UB
j = d
UB
j + . . .+ d
UB
J .
The Kaplan-Meier type estimators for the cause specific hazard rate and the overall survivor
curve for the distribution of observed transition to state k 6= K are
λˆbk(tj|x) = dbkj/nbj with b ∈ {LB,UB} and λˆLBc (tj|x) = dLBcj /nLBj ;
SˆLB(tj|x) =
j−1∏
u=1
(
1−
K−1∑
k=1
λˆLBk (tu)− λˆLBc (tu)
)
and SˆUB(tj|x) =
j−1∏
u=1
(
1−
K−1∑
k=1
λˆUBk (tu)
)
.(5)
Note that that these estimators are consistent as the right censoring is independent. A consis-
tent estimator for the bounds given in (3) and (4) is then:
Iˆbk(tj|x) =
j∑
u=1
λˆbk(tu|x)Sˆb(tu|x) with b ∈ {LB,UB} (6)
and k 6= K.
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In analogy to Lee and Wilke (2005), we use the monotone relations given in (3) and (4) to
bound a difference-in-differences estimator. Suppose there is a policy intervention in a natural
experiment setting and we have X = (G,P, Y ). There are two groups, the control group
(G = g0) and the treatment group (G = g1), and two time intervals, the pre-reform period
(P = pt0) and the post-reform period (P = pt1). Y is a vector of other observable individual
variables such as gender, age etc. The reform of interest is supposed to have an effect on the
observed risk-specific transition distribution of the treatment group in the post-reform years.
Under the assumption that the CIC of treatment and control group would have followed parallel
paths without the reform, the effect of the reform can be estimated by a difference-in-differences
estimator (DID) as (see also Abadie, 2005 for a review of nonparametric identification of DID
models)
∆Ik(tj|y) = [Ik(tj|g1, pt1, y)− Ik(tj|g0, pt1, y)]− [Ik(tj|g1, pt0, y)− Ik(tj|g0, pt0, y)] (7)
for r = 1, . . . , K − 1, where Ik(tj|g, p, y) = P (Tk ≤ tj, r = k|G = g, P = p, Y = y). Given that
we can only identify intervals for the risk-specific cumulative incidence curve it is straightforward
to bound ∆Ik (Lee and Wilke, 2005):
lIk(tj|y) =max[−1, {ILBk (tj|g1, pt1, y)− IUBk (tj|g0, pt1, y)}
− {IUBk (tj|g1, pt0, y)− ILBk (tj|g0, pt0, y)}] (8)
and
uIk(tj|y) =min[1, {IUBk (tj|g1, pt1, y)− ILBk (tj|g0, pt1, y)}
− {ILBk (tj|g1, pt0, y)− IUBk (tj|g0, pt0, y)}] (9)
for k = 1, . . . , K − 1. Note that the lower and upper bound are restricted to be between -1 and
1. This is due to the fact that the maximum variation of probabilities cannot be larger than 1
in absolute values. The reform effect is estimated by replacing the upper and lower bounds by
consistent estimators as defined in (6).
From (3)-(4) it can be seen that the width of the bounds of the DID changes in (8)-
(9) depends on P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y) and P (δ = 1|g, p, y). As these worst-case bounds
can be wide, there are several approaches to tighten them. In addition to monotonicity or
independence assumptions as in Lee and Wilke (2005) one could use economic reasoning to
tighten the feasible interval for P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y) in (2). With this respect it is important
to note that P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y) can be modelled as a function of time, while in (3) and (4)
it was assumed to be constant. As an example, P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y) could be assumed to
decrease with an increasing gap after ς. Another approach would be to increase the share of
fully identified unemployment durations by determining an appropriate sample of unidentified
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spells that can be excluded from the estimations without changing the estimates for the CICs
in (3) and (4). Formally, this approach reduces P (δ = 1|g, p, y).
Another possibility is to assume that the conditional probability P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y)
is independent of G and P , i.e. P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y) = P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y) which only
depends on other individual characteristics Y . The DID changes of the CIC from (7) can then
be decomposed as follows:
∆cIk(tj|y) = ∆Ik(tj, δ = 0|y) + P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y)∆Ik(tj, δ = 1|y) (10)
with the effect of the reform on the CIC for different values of δ defined as :
∆Ik(tj, δ = 0|y) = Ik(tj, δ = 0|g1, pt1, y)− Ik(tj, δ = 0|g0, pt1, y)
− Ik(tj, δ = 0|g1, pt0, y) + Ik(tj, δ = 0|g0, pt0, y), and (11)
∆Ik(tj, δ = 1|y) = Ik(tj, δ = 1|r 6= K, g1, pt1, y)− Ik(tj, δ = 1|r 6= K, g0, pt1, y)
− Ik(tj, δ = 1|r 6= K, g1, pt0, y) + Ik(tj, δ = 1|r 6= K, g0, pt0, y). (12)
In order to determine bounds we have to minimize and maximize (10) by assigning appro-
priate P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y) at each tj: If ∆Ik(tj, δ = 1|y) > 0, set P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y) = 1 and if
∆Ik(tj, δ = 1|y) < 0, set P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y) = 0 to maximise (10). The minimum is attained in
the reversed way. Thus the lower bound of ∆cIk(tj|y) is always smaller than the upper bound
and the width of the bound is |∆Ik(tj, δ = 1|y)| which is tighter than the worst-case bound.
Moreover, P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y) is now a function of tj. Under the additional assumption, (11)
and (12) are thus obtained by bounding the DID changes instead of bounding the CIC as in the
case of the worst-case bounds in (8) and (9). A common difficulty of all approaches to tighten
the bounds is to verify their validity in an application.
3 Empirical Application
We apply the above framework to bound the effect of reducing the maximum duration of
receiving unemployment benefits on the observed transitions from unemployment to local
and non-local employment via migration. We begin this section with a brief description of
the German unemployment compensation system and discuss the 1997 reform of unemploy-
ment benefit entitlements. This discussion is based on the Employment Promotion Act (Ar-
beitsfo¨rderungsgesetz ), the Social Welfare Act III (Sozialgesetzbuch III ) and several secondary
sources such as Plaßmann (2002), Oschmiansky et al. (2001) and Wolff (2003). We then intro-
duce the data and discuss the selection of treatment and control group before we present the
result of bounding the effect as described in the previous sections.
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Basic features of the unemployment compensation system During the study period,
the system of unemployment compensation in Germany consists of two main components:
unemployment benefits (UNB) and unemployment assistance (UNA). As an insurance, unem-
ployment benefits are limited in time depending on the length of socially insured employment
during a period of seven years before the benefit claim. Moreover, the length of benefit re-
ceipt positively depends on age with a maximum UNB receipt of 12 months for younger age
groups and up to 32 months for older age groups in the years prior to the 1997 reform. After
exhausting UNB, unemployed individuals receive the tax-funded unemployment assistance if
they pass a means-test. Both UNB and UNA are a percentage of former wage income with
UNB replacing 63% (68%) of former wage income and UNA still reaching income replacement
rates of 53% (57%) for individuals without (with) dependent children. For individuals with low
pre-unemployment wages, income replacement rates irrespective of the type of unemployment
compensation may even be close to 100% because of receiving complementary social benefits
if the unemployment compensation as a percentage of former wage income does not suffice
to ensure the legally defined minimum standard of living. Thus, the effect of shortening the
length of entitlements to unemployment benefits is not homogeneous. In particular, recipients
of complementary social benefits are not affected by a change in the length of UNB receipt. By
contrast, unemployed individuals without additional social benefits but with eligibility for the
means-tested UNA loose around 10% of their former wage income when switching from UNB to
UNA. For this group, a shortening of UNB is likely to have a small effect only. Individuals who
do not pass the means test for receiving UNA due to other income sources or private savings
even loose all unemployment compensation after exhausting UNB. The threat of entitlement
loss should thus be strongest for this rather small group of unemployed.
1997 Reform In April 1997, a major reform of the Employment Promotion Act came into
force to shorten the receipt of UNB for some of the older age groups.3 In Germany, the potential
UNB duration (PUNBD), i.e. the maximum duration of UNB receipt at the beginning of the
unemployment period, positively depends on the period of socially insured employment within
the seven years prior to the benefit claim. This so called extended claim period is restricted by
previous benefit claims and thus may be shorter than seven years. In addition, the PUNBD
positively depends on age. During the 1980s, the PUNBD had successively been expanded
for older age groups. Thus, before the reform in 1997, entitlements to UNB lasted up to 32
months for individuals above the age of 42, while the PUNBD for individuals below this age
3In addition, the introduction of stricter sanction rules for the non-compliance with eligibility requirements
may have accelerated transitions from unemployment to employment for all age groups after 1997 (Boone et
al., 2002, 2004).
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range was only 12 months. A detailed description of these earlier reforms can be found in Hunt
(1995). One well-documented result of these earlier reforms that demonstrates the disincentive
effect of this system was the rapid increase of early retirees whose extremely long UNB receipt
allowed for bridging the gap between employment and retirement age (Fitzenberger and Wilke,
2004). In 1997, the PUNBD was reduced for some of the older age groups by lowering the age
limits for certain maximum entitlement length (see Table 1). As a consequence, the PUNBD
for individuals between 42 and 43 years of age was cut from 18 month before 1997 to 12 month
after the 1997 reform. For individuals aged 44, UNB was even cut from a maximum receipt of
22 to a maximum receipt of 12 months. Individuals aged below 42 years were unaffected by
the reform as they always received a maximum of 12 month of UNB. The 1997 reform thus
provides a natural experiment with a credible source of variation in PUNBD that can be used
to identify its causal effect. As a drawback, however, the implementation of the reform was
partially cushioned. Until March 1999, new benefit claimants were treated according to the
pre-reform regulations if there was a work history of more than one year during the three years
prior to the benefit claim. Thus, the new regulations applied to all new benefit claims after
March 1999 only.
Table 1: Potential unemployment benefit duration (PUNBD) for
UNB claimants up to age 47 by work history and age, IAB-R01
Soc. insured employment PUNBD (in month)
during claim period until 03/97 since 04/97
12 month 6 6
16 month 8 8
20 month 10 10
24 month 12 12
28 month 14 (age ≥42) 14 (age ≥45)
32 month 16 (age ≥42) 16 (age ≥45)
36 month 18 (age ≥42) 18 (age ≥45)
40 month 20 (age ≥44) 20 (age ≥47)
44 month 22 (age ≥44) 22 (age ≥47)
Source: Plaßmann (2002)
Two German studies already looked at the effect of the 1997 reform on transitions from
unemployment to employment. Based on the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP), Wolff
(2003) only finds very weak positive effects of shortening the PUNBD on the transitions to
employment in eastern Germany. As discussed, this finding may reflect that the entitlement
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loss due to the 1997 reform was rather limited for most groups. Moreover, due to the limited
sample size of the GSOEP data, the study pools unemployment spells starting between 1990
and 1999 and thus includes only a limited number of spells that were actually affected by the
reform. In the subsequent analysis, we use an administrative data set that provides a much
larger sample size and thus also allows for distinguishing between exits to local versus exits to
non-local employment after migration. Based on the same data set, Mu¨ller et al. (2007) find
evidence that the 1997 reform reduced the inflow into unemployment and drastically reduced
the duration of unemployment among individuals above age 52, a result that suggests that a
shortening of the maximum UNB receipt lowers the attractiveness of early retirement. Using
the same administrative data set, we reexamine the effect of the PUBD on transitions to local
and non-local employment of prime age individuals for whom early retirement should not be
an issue.
Data: IAB-R01 The analysis is based on the IAB-R01, the IAB employment subsample
1975-2001 - regional file (Hamann et al., 2004). This administrative data set contains infor-
mation on a 2 % sample of the population working in jobs that are subject to social insurance
payments concerning spells of employment and spells for which the individual received un-
employment compensation (UC) from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit) such as unemployment benefits (UNB), unemployment assistance (UNA) and mainte-
nance payments during training measures (MP). These administrative records are provided as
spells on daily basis. Individual employment trajectories are only partly identified as there are
gaps which can correspond to a period of unemployment without the receipt of unemployment
compensation or to other unobserved labor market states. This is why the true unemployment
duration is often not observed (see also Lee and Wilke, 2005). In this data right-censoring
occurs at the end of the observation period. An unemployment period belongs to the case
δ = 0 if there is a permanent receipt of income transfers. It requires an individual to receive
UC within one month after the end of an employment period and intermediate gaps between
the receipt of UC or the gap between the end of UC receipt and employment do not exceed one
month. Otherwise an observation belongs to the case δ = 1. In this case we observe ς which is
the beginning of an unobserved period.
For all unemployment spells that exit to employment, the IAB-R01 allows for comparing
the microcensus region of the old and the new workplace. In the following analysis, a movement
between non-adjacent labor market regions (Arbeitsmarktregionen) is considered as migration.
The 227 labor market regions (LMRs) in Germany comprise typical daily commuting ranges
such that for the majority of individuals both residence and workplace are located within the
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LMR. Since individuals living at the fringe of an LMR may nevertheless easily commute to the
adjacent LMR, what is considered a local job change has been extended to include all adjacent
LMRs. Finding employment in a non-adjacent LMR should thus necessitate residential mobility
in most cases. For each spell of unemployment, the analysis thus distinguishes exits to a local
job, exits to a non-local job after migration and exits to other destination states.
For our analysis, we include inflow samples for a pre- and a post-reform era. Due to the
implementation of stricter sanction rules in 1994, extending the pre-reform era beyond 1995,
might mix different reforms. We therefore consider an unemployment spell starting between
1995 and 1996 as a pre-reform spell. The post-reform era is predetermined by the fact that
the implementation of new UB regulations did not start before 1999. The post-reform inflow
sample thus consists of all unemployment spells starting in 1999 or 2000. Since the observation
period of the IAB-R01 ends on 12/31/2001, the duration of a post-reform spell is between one
and three years only.
In order to take account of the heterogeneous treatment effect that comes with the 1997
reform, we distinguish between two skill groups because the reform effect should be weaker
for less-skilled 4 workers as they typically have a lower wage. For this reason they are more
likely to receive complementary social benefits or pass the means test for the receipt of UNA
than their high-skilled5 counterparts. Besides the household context, the wage determines the
eligibility for complementary social benefits. Unfortunately, the IAB-R01 does not include
enough information to actually identify recipients of complementary social benefits. In our
analysis a lower educational degree is therefore a proxy for the eligibility of complementary
social benefits.
Choosing the treatment and control group The aim of the analysis is to identify the
effect of being eligible for an extended UNB duration on the transitions from unemployment
to either a local job or a non-local job. Due to the reform in 1997, eligibility to an extended
UNB duration of more than 12 month was cut for individuals aged 42-44 years, while the
PUNBD of individuals below this age was unaffected by the reform. Thus individuals aged
36-41 years serve as the group to control for changing labor market conditions when comparing
transitions to local and non-local employment before and after the reform. However, since
only individuals with long UNB entitlements are affected by the reform, the exact choice of
treatment and control group has to be conditioned not only on age, but also on the entitlement
length at the beginning of the unemployment period. This is because choosing the treatment
and control group based on their actual UNB entitlements results in a non-comparability of
4Includes individuals who are either unskilled or have a vocational training and work as blue-collar workers.
5Includes individuals with a tertiary education or white-collar workers with at least a vocational training.
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individuals in the control and treatment group with regard to their working history because
the criterium to reach maximum entitlements, for instance, is less strict for the younger cohort
(see Table 1). Therefore, a suitable selection rule should be the same for both treatment
and control group to ensure that the groups are comparable with regard to their working
history. As a solution, we compute counterfactual UNB entitlements as the hypothetical UNB
entitlement length in the absence of the 1997 reform had the individual been aged 42-44 at the
time of benefit claim (see Appendix A for details). As can be seen in Table 2, the resulting
counterfactual UNB entitlements are quite comparable for both age groups (Pearson chi2(9)
= 14.9). For the subsequent analysis, we choose all unemployment spells that begin with a
receipt of unemployment benefits and whose counterfactual UNB duration exceeds 12 month.
This selection rule thus ensures the comparability between the treatment and the control group
and the existence of some minimum treatment for the treatment group. For the observable
characteristics in the IAB-R01, Appendix B confirms that treatment and control group are
quite comparable. Unfortunately, characteristics such as the marital status and dependent
children which are likely to affect the likelihood of migration are missing in the data. The
DiD approach in the subsequent analysis thus rests on the assumption that the composition of
treatment and control group in the pre- and post-reform era are also comparable with respect
to these unobserved characteristics. Moreover, the DiD approach assumes that both groups
experience similar changes in labor market conditions in the post- compared with the pre-reform
era. This assumption could fail if older workers face more problems in finding employment
during economic downturn than their younger counterparts because of stricter employment
protection. Since this is not the case for job seekers between 36 and 44, the improved labor
market conditions in the post-reform era should boost the transition to employment for both
groups to a comparable extent.
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Table 2: Estimated counterfactual UNB entitlement length for unemployment
spells in the pre- and post-reform era by age groupa, IAB-R01
Age 36-41 Age 42-44
UNB duration # spells % # spells %
≤ 2 months 1,226 6.8 551 7.6
3-4 months 1,212 6.7 473 6.6
5-6 months 1,061 5.9 423 5.9
7-8 months 1,092 6.1 440 6.1
9-10 months 1,194 6.6 463 6.4
11-12 months 1,017 5.6 444 6.2
13-14 months 1,182 6.6 486 6.7
15-16 months 1,026 5.7 435 6.0
17-18 months 9,008 50.0 3,505 48.6
Total 18,018 100.0 7,220 100.0
a Includes all previously full-time employed individuals born in West Germany whose unemployment spell
starts with the receipt of unemployment benefits.
For the analysis, we restrict our sample to previous full-time employees to keep the sample
more homogeneous in terms of labor force attachment. We also exclude unemployment spells of
women because missing information on marital status and dependent children in the IAB-R01
aggravates the interpretation of corresponding results. In addition, we restrict the analysis
to individuals from western Germany because the working history for individuals from eastern
Germany is not known before 1991 which aggravates the comparability of computed entitlement
length. For the resulting control group and the post-reform treatment group the estimated
actual entitlement length as shown in Table 3 that is subject to the 1997 reform and the true
age of the individual is up to 12 month6 only. In the pre-reform era, the treatment group is
entitled to 18.5 month of UNB receipt on average, while in the post-reform era this average UNB
duration falls to 11.8 month. This latter UNB receipt is almost exactly the UNB duration for
the control group in the pre- and post-reform era. The average treatment thus is a reduction
of UNB entitlements of 6.7 month with the treatment ranging from a reduction of one to a
reduction of ten month for individuals aged 44 with maximum UNB entitlements.
6For some individuals who do not fulfill the criterium for the maximum entitlement length, but still pass the
selection criterium, the true UNB duration may be lower than 12 month.
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Table 3: Estimated actual UNB entitlement length for unemployment spells
with counterfactual UNB of >12 months in the pre- and post-reform era by
treatment and control group, IAB-R01
Control group Treatment group
UNB duration pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
6-8 months 2.1% 1.3% 0.00% 1.5%
9-11 months 6.9% 4.5% 0.00% 5.6%
12 months 91.0% 94.2% 0.00% 93.0%
13-14 months 0.0% 0.0% 8.1% 0.0%
15-16 months 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 0.0%
17-18 months 0.0% 0.0% 56.4% 0.0%
19-20 months 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0%
21-22 months 0.0% 0.0% 25.2% 0.0%
Average months 11.8 11.9 18.5 11.8
Total spells 4,294 3,577 1,557 1,436
Table 4 shows exit types and median unemployment duration for both unemployment defi-
nitions. Due to the end of the observation period, the degree of censoring is more pronounced
in the post-reform year. Moreover, exits to other destination states are much more likely for
the LB spells. Note also that median unemployment durations are shorter for all groups in the
post-reform years. As has been discussed previously, this may reflect a combination of better
labor market conditions compared to the pre-reform years as well as the stricter sanction rules
that applied to both the control and the treatment group. Moreover, the simple descriptive
statistics for both unemployment definitions suggest that the treatment group has a somewhat
longer unemployment duration, but that the gap between treatment and control group almost
disappears after the reform. Among the non-censored spells, both unemployment definitions
suggest that the treatment group in the post-reform period almost catches up with the higher
exit probability of the control group, especially for exits to local employment.
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Table 4: Descriptive summary of full sample, IAB-R01
Control group Treatment group
pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
LB spells
median duration (days) 79 73 88 73
exit to local job 54.5% (54.9%) 53.8% (57.0%) 53.4% (53.9%) 52.9% (56.2%)
exit to non-local job 7.7% (7.8%) 8.4% (8.9%) 6.7% (6.8%) 8.2% (8.7%)
exit to other destination 37.1% (37.3%) 32.1% (34.1%) 39.0% (39.3%) 32.9% (35.0%)
total exits 99.3% (100.0%) 94.3% (100.0%) 99.1% (100.0%) 94.0% (100.0%)
UB spells
median duration (days) 161 124 185 130.5
exit to local job 75.1% (77.4%) 65.9% (74.6%) 72.1% (75.1%) 64.8% (74.1%)
exit to non-local job 12.8% (13.1%) 11.0% (12.5%) 12.5% (13.0%) 11.2% (12.8%)
exit to other destination 9.2% (9.5%) 11.4% (12.9%) 11.4% (11.9%) 11.5% (13.1%)
total exits 97.1% (100.0%) 88.3% (100.0%) 96.0% (100.0%) 87.5% (100.0%)
Total spells 4,294 3,577 1,557 1,436
Bounds Analysis We estimate bounds for the effect of the reform on the cumulative in-
cidence of non-local and local re-employment for different skill groups by applying formulas
(8)-(9). Moreover, we also add the asymptotically valid 90% joint confidence intervals for up-
per and lower bounds, which are computed following the bootstrap procedure of Horowitz and
Manski (2000), also applied by Lee and Wilke (2005). The bootstrap repetitions are 500. Figure
3 shows that the partial identification problem of our interval data precludes any clear result
pattern as none of the bounds cross the zero during the treatment period.
As another interesting observation, we find that the resulting bounds do not coincide with
the point estimates for the lower and upper bound of the latent variable. As shown in Appendix
C, point estimates for the different definitions of the unemployment duration data do not span
the full width of our estimated bounds. This suggests that a sensitivity analysis based on
different transition time definitions alone may be misleading.
Approaches to tighten the bounds As indicated in the theoretical part there are several
approaches to tighten the bounds. In a first attempt we assume monotonicity and independence
as done by Lee and Wilke (2005). Bounds become tighter but for some time intervals they
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Figure 3: Lower and upper bound of the DiD changes of the cumulative incidence of local
(upper) and non-local (lower) exits to employment among high-skilled (left) and less-skilled
(right) unemployed.
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cross so that the assumptions do not seem to be valid in our empirical project. Another
natural attempt to tighten the bounds is to restrict the interval for P (r 6= K|δ = 1). One
could for example assume a shorter interval such as [0.1, 0.9]. Alternatively, one could also
assume that P (r 6= K|δ = 1) decreases with the distance between ς and sk 6=K , i.e. the length
of the unobserved period. In other words, if the unobserved period is short, it is less likely
that someone transits to an unobserved labor market state such as self-employment. As an
example, one could assume that P (r 6= K|δ = 1) is an exponential density. We have estimated
the bounds under several such scenarios. Resulting bounds are tighter and suggest that the
change in the CICs is positive for the high-skilled group. Results are, however, not presented
as it is difficult to prove the validity of these assumption.
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Additional assumptions concerning P (r 6= K|δ = 1) are thus able to tighten the bounds but
in our case they may appear arbitrary. Since the share of partly identified spells (δ = 1) in our
sample is about 25%, another worthwhile approach is to reduce it. As an exercise, we exclude
observations without receiving unemployment compensation within one month after the end
of employment, i.e. we exclude spells with δ = 1 and ς = 0. This is done as these spells are
least informative in the sense that the interval [ς, sk 6=K ] is often large. The resulting bounds are
again tighter and suggest again some weak increase in the CICs for the high skilled while there
are no apparent changes for the low skilled. As discussed above, this approach is only valid if
the exclusion of spells is a random sample in the sense that the sample composition does not
change and the shape of the conditional CICs in (3) and (4) does not change. As the latter
condition is not well supported by the data, we decided not to proceed in this way.
Figure 4: Lower and upper bounds of the DiD changes of the cumulative incidence of local
(upper) and non-local (lower) exits to employment among high-skilled (left) and less-skilled
(right) unemployed, additional assumption
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Our final attempt to tighten the bounds is therefore to impose the additional independence
assumption P (r 6= K|δ = 1, g, p, y) = P (r 6= K|δ = 1, y). The resulting bounds in Figure 4 are
much tighter. They again suggest larger changes in observed exit probabilities for high-skilled
job seekers for whom the threat of entitlement loss after exhausting UNB is likely to be larger.
In particular, the figure shows that the observed post-reform probability of migration after
one year of unemployment is 3-5pp higher for high-skilled individuals while the corresponding
bounds for less-skilled individuals suggest a change of 0-1pp only. Moreover, point estimates
also indicate an increasing observed transition probability to local employment after one year
of unemployment of 4-6pp for high-skilled individuals only. For high-skilled individuals, the
corresponding relative change in the observed probability of migration is approximately 15-
25% while the corresponding change for exits to local employment is around 10-15% only. If
we would assume independent risks, these findings would have a causal interpretation in the
sense that extensive unemployment benefits mainly allow for avoiding or postponing migration
such that the reduction of UNB entitlements primarily fosters the willingness to migrate. In
light of the institutional design in Germany, this finding is quite plausible as the counteracting
resource effect suggested by Tatsiramos (2003) is likely to be small. This is because unemployed
individuals irrespective of whether receiving UNB or UNA get financial support for search costs
and moving costs. The negative effect of higher reservation wages in case of higher UNB receipt
should thus likely exceed any resource effect. Also due to the missing statistical significance
which is probably due to the limited sample size, however, all of these findings are only weakly
suggestive for some reform effects on leaving unemployment locally or non-locally and thus call
for additional future research with a larger sample size. As another interesting observation, we
generally observe a smooth variation of the bounds with the duration of unemployment. This
does not suggest any remarkable jumps in the hazard rate or survivor function at the begin of
the treatment. Our results therefore support the theoretical results of non-stationary job-search
(van den Berg, 1990).
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a nonparametric approach that allows for analyzing a competing risk
model with partially identified interval data. Our bounds analysis is a highly relevant approach
for applied researchers who face this data limitation. It extends the nonparametric bounds
analysis by Lee and Wilke (2005) to a dependent competing risk setting and derives bounds
for the risk-specific cumulative incidence curve. Although our approach does not resolve the
non-identifiability of competing risks and thus precludes a direct causal inference, it provides a
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flexible descriptive tool for the observed risk-specific transition distribution. In particular, our
approach is fully nonparametric and we avoid parametric assumptions on our duration model
that may be violated in the real world. Moreover, we suggest several approaches to tighten the
bounds in an application.
In our empirical application with German data, we have explored the effect of reducing
the receipt of unemployment benefits on the observed transitions to either local or non-local
employment via migration. Our results show that partial identification is a big problem in
merged administrative individual data that may preclude any causal inference. Moreover, point
estimates for the lower and upper bound of the latent variable do not span the full width of
our estimated bounds. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis based on the two point estimates alone
may be misleading. By imposing additional assumptions we are able to tighten the bounds
considerable. Without showing statistical significance, the bounds are suggestive for a stronger
reform effect on observed exit probabilities for the high-skilled segment for whom the threat
of entitlement loss after exhausting UNB is likely to be largest. This indicates that extensive
unemployment benefits mainly substitute for migration. The recent labor market reforms in
Germany could therefore foster migration and accelerate exits to local employment.
The limitations of our approach point towards some interesting extensions. With regard
to data limitations, data with more information on individual and household characteristics
would be desirable to reexamine our empirical results. Such additional information would
also allow to distinguish groups for whom a shorter receipt of unemployment benefits implies
different entitlement losses. Moreover, repeating the analysis with a longer post-reform period
or a larger sample size should be worthwhile to improve the statistical significance of the
data. In addition, the causal inference from our empirical results is limited because of the
unresolved identification problem of the competing risks. A promising route for future research
thus is to combine our bounds framework for partially missing data with attempts to break
the non-identifiability of dependent competing risks such as Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006).
However, as a disadvantage to our current bounds framework for cumulative incidence curves,
such attempts necessitate additional assumptions. Moreover, a tightening of bounds could be
achieved by estimating P (r 6= K|δ = 1) with additional information. This could be done for
example if a sample of the administrative data would be merged with survey data that fully
identifies the employment trajectories.
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Appendix A - Computation of actual and counterfactual UNB enti-
tlements
The entitlement length at the beginning of the unemployment spell is not included in the data
and has to be computed based on the known employment history, age and the known regulations
and changes across time. For this purpose, we compute the claim period which encompasses a
maximum of three years prior to making the UNB claim, but ends with a previous UNB claim
within this three years period. In the same token, we calculate the employment duration within
the relevant extended claim period of up to seven years prior to making the claim. As previously
mentioned, UNB entitlements depend on the duration of socially insured employment within
the relevant claim and the relevant extended claim period. Unemployment benefits exceeding
6 month necessitate at least 12 month socially ensured employment within the claim period.
Thus, an individual with at least 12 month socially ensured employment within the claim period
and 24 month within the extended claim period gets 12 month of UNB. If there is a shortened
claim period due to a previous UNB claim, the new UNB claim based on the employment
periods after this last unemployment period may be extended up to the age-specific PUNBD
by remaining entitlements at the end of the previous unemployment period if the beginning of
the last UNB claim lies within the last seven years.
For the estimation of actual UNB entitlements all changing regulations throughout the
1980s and 1990s have been applied. For the counterfactual UNB entitlements, we apply the
pre-reform conditions to the post-reform period and compute the UNB entitlements as if all
individuals had been 42 by the time of the benefit claim. More precisely, we adjust the whole
age history of an individual as if, for example, an individual aged 38 at the beginning of the
unemployment period had always been four years older. This adjustment alone does not ensure
the comparability of the resulting counterfactual entitlements for the pre- and post-reform
period because entitlements depend on the entire work history which is subject to all previous
changes in regulations. We therefore compute the counterfactual entitlements for the post-
reform period had all changes in regulations been shifted by five years, the difference between
the pre- and post-reform period. This procedure ensures a twofold: (i) the comparability of
counterfactual UNB entitlements for all age groups irrespective of whether the unemployment
period starts prior or after the reform and (ii) the equivalence of counterfactual and actual UNB
entitlements for the treatment group in the pre-reform era. As a consequence, the treatment
group in the pre-reform period with counterfactual UNB entitlements of more than 12 month
actually has entitlements of more than 12 month while all others who fulfil this criterium
actually receive UNB for a maximum of 12 month only, but are comparable to the former
group in terms of their employment history.
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Appendix B - Descriptive summary of sample characteristics
Control group Treatment group
Age (years) 38.3 38.3 43.0 43.0
High school degree 8.6 8.0 8.9 7.7
Vocational training 82.8 83.1 83.1 82.7
Tertiary education 8.6 8.9 8.0 9.5
1st wage quintile 22.0 22.1 23.9 23.9
2nd wage quintile 26.8 30.3 24.0 29.1
3rd wage quintile 20.3 22.9 20.7 20.2
4th wage quintile 17.0 14.8 16.8 14.0
5th wage quintile 14.0 9.9 14.6 12.8
Tenure prev. job (days) 1172.9 1128.6 1385.0 1244.7
Tenure in claim period (days) 1471.4 1434.3 1563.1 1439.2
Prev. recall 17.0 19.6 17.1 19.8
Skilled blue-collar 43.5 43.3 42.8 43.1
Unskilled blue-collar 32.8 31.8 33.7 31.0
White-collar 23.7 25.0 23.4 25.9
Prev. unemployment 73.8 78.9 70.4 77.3
Total spells 4,294 3,577 1,557 1,436
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Appendix C - Point estimates for lower and upper bound of treatment
effect on the cumulative incidence of local(left) and non-local(right)
exits to employment among high-skilled unemployed.
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The point estimations for the treatment effect using the lower bound and upper bound of
the employment duration data are done by using the following formulas:
lIk(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = {ILBk (tj|1, pt1, x)− ILBk (tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {ILBk (tj|1, pt0, x)− ILBk (tj|0, pt0, x)}
and
uIk(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = {IUBk (tj|1, pt1, x)− IUBk (tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {IUBk (tj|1, pt0, x)− IUBk (tj|0, pt0, x)}
for k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
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